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ABSTRACT
We examine the efficiency properties of an abstractly
given market mechanism. This consists of a smooth map from
traders' strategy-choices to their net trades. When the number
of traders is finite (the oligopolistic case), it is shown that
Nash equilibria "tend to be" inefficient for "most" utilities.
The phenomenon is analyzed via a certain set of "ultra-optimal"
points that are determined solely by the mechanism. In the
last section we apply our results to the Shapley-Shubik
mechanisms by way of an illustration.

Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria in Strategic Market Games
by
P. Dubey and J. D. Rogawski
1. Introduction
In this paper we examine the efficiency properties of an
abstractly given market mechanism. This consists of a map from traders'
strategy choices to their net trades. We restrict attention to the
case for which the map is smooth. The classical example is, of course,
Cournot's partial equilibrium model of 1838. In the last few years
there has been a revival of interest in Cournot's basic model in a
general equilibrium framework (see, in particular, the articles and
references in [5]). These analyses center on the Nash Equilibria (N.E.)
of strategic games induced by market mechanisms. A key question that
naturally arises is: to what extent do the N.E. yield efficient allo-
cations? The issue was discussed in [4] for a continuum of traders.
It was shown in [4] that if, in addition to being smooth, a mechanism
satisfies certain other properties, then its N.E. allocations are
always efficient—indeed they are Walrasian. Our paper may be regarded
as dual to [4], for its overall result is: when there is a finite number
of traders, the N.E. "tend to be" generically inefficient. Two special
instances of this result have been noted earlier. In [2] the inefficiency
was established under the condition that the dimension of each trader's
strategy set is at most £-1, where I is the number of commodities in
the economy. This condition was dropped in [4], but a much weaker
assertion was made, namely: for any mechanism there exists an open
set of economies, each of which has at least one inefficient N.E.
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Expressing the hope that it should be possible to go much further,
Mas Colell observed ([6]) that "the issue is more complex than it
appears at first sight. Indeed, the incentive compatibility literature
(see the recent Review of Economic Studies [7] Symposium) has taught
us that it is possible to design mechanisms yielding Pareto Optimal
[i.e., efficient] noncooperative [i.e., Nash] equilibria." We sketch
a proof (see remark 3. A in section 3) that a smooth mechanism with
efficient N.E. is exceptional; in other words, if such a mechanism is
perturbed a little, inefficiency will reappear. More precisely, for a
generic choice of mechanisms and of traders' utilities, efficient N.E.
are submanifolds of positive codimension within the N.E. manifold.
But, if one is interested in any particular mechanism, it is
impossible to decide whether it is "generic" or not and the above result
tells us nothing. The bulk of our paper concerns an arbitrarily fixed
mechanism. Thus specific examples can be studied by our methods. In
section 4, we analyze the "sell-all" and "buy-sell" models of Shapley
and Shubik by way of an illustration.
Let us briefly outline our results. Consider an exchange
I
economy with I commodities and n traders. Denote by a. e R the initial
I
endowment of trader j and by u. : R.. + R his utility function. Further
suppose that a smooth manifold S. is given for each j as his strategy
set. Let S = S n x ... xS . A market mechanism $= ($ 1 , ..., $ ) con-1 n 1 n'
sists of n smooth maps
$ . : S + R* ,
J +
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n n
where E $. (s) = Z a. for all s e S. Thus <S defines reallocations
J-l J J-l J
of the initial endowment as a function of traders' strategy-choices.
For any s = (s , ..., s ), let Y (s) = {$.(s , ..., s. , t, s , ..., s )
1 n J J 1 j-l j+1 n
t e S.} be the set of commodity bundles that j can obtain by changing
his own strategy while the other players remain fixed according to s.
We will assume, given our smooth context, that Y.(s) is a submanifold
of R . (In the terminology of [4] , this ensures that all the N.E. are
"proper.")
If the dimension of Y.(s) were 2,, trader j could move to the
"northeast" of R (thereby increasing his holding of each commodity)
and no N.E. would exist. It is natural to rule this out and to require
that he cannot get "something from nothing." We take dim Y.(s) <_ Z-l
from now on.
The analysis is broken into two cases. First suppose that
dim Y.(s) = k. < 2,-1 for all 1 < j < n and s e S, with k. < l-l for at
J J
-
~ - J
least one j. Put k = k.. + ... + k and k, = max k.. Also denote
1 n *
, . J
by N(u) C S the set of N.E. when utilities u = (u
1
, ..., u ) are assigned
to the traders, and by EN(u) C N(u) the set of efficient N.E. We show
(remark 3.3) that, for a generic choice of u, EN(u) has codimension at
leat k. + (n-l)U-l) - k > in N(u) . In short "most" N.E.'s are
inefficient for generic utilities.
It remains to consider the case when dim Y.(s) = £-1 for all
1
_< j _< n and s e S. This is perhaps the most natural from an economic
point of view (and was, incidentally, made an assumption in [4], see
page 235). For the interpretation, suppose that trading is done via
prices. (Our set-up does not need this restriction but, of course,
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does not exclude it either) . Then a strategy choice s e S produces not
only the allocation £.. (s) , ..., $ (s) , but also prices p(s) z R . The
net trade ±>.(s) - a. of any j must satisfy the "budget-constraint"
p(s)*($.(s) - a.) = 0, where ' •' denotes dot product. In this situa-
tion the assumption dim Y.(s) = l-l means that j can enter freely as
a buyer or a seller for each commodity, provided only that he balance
his budget. If prices were constant we would get the familiar "budget
hyperplane" of Walrasian analysis. Here we have, more generally, a
hypersurface because each trader affects the prices by his actions, which
is of the essence in such games.
When dim Y.(s) = i-1 for all j and ¥, the codimension of EN(u)
in N(u)—for generic u—does not have a positive lower bound that is
invariant of the choice of $, i.e., EN(u) could be full-dimensional in
N("u) for some $. What is true (see Proposition 3.2) is that N(u)
has codimension n(£-l) in S; and the set of efficient strategies E(u)
has codimension (n-l)(£-l) in S. If the two sets N(u) and E(u) were
to intersect transversally , then the codimension of EN(u) = N(u) il E(u)
would be (n-l)(£-l) in N(u). Such is indeed the generic picture if we
vary not only the utilities u but also the mechanism $ (remark 3.4).
This picture, however, provides no information about what happens for an
arbitrarily fixed $.
The analysis for fixed $ hinges on a certain set S and its
image $(S )• Let V.(s~) be the normal direction to Y (s) at the point
$.(¥). Put S = {¥ £ S: Y n (¥) = ... = Y (¥)}. Note that S depends
J UO -L n uU
only on the mechanism $. We show (Proposition 2.2) that—for any choice
of utilities—an N.E. is efficient if, and only if, it lies in SUQ , i.e.,
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EN(u) = N(u) H S for any u. Therefore we nickname S the set of
"ultra-optimal" points of $. The analysis of the efficiency of N.E .
for any $ is reduced to the analysis of its Sp . If the codimension
of $(S ) (in the space of reallocations) is n or more, then—for
generic u—the set EN(u) is empty, i.e., all N.E. are inefficient.
This is Proposition 3.1. In general we have a somewhat watered-down
version of this result. Proposition 3.2 states that if S has codimen-
sion t in S , then EN(u) also has codimension t in N(u) for generic u.
(Thus if t > dim N(u) = dim S - n (£-1), then again EN(u) is empty...
see Corollary 3.3.) Finally we sketch an argument (remark 3. A) that
the codimension of S in S is (n-l)(£-l) for a generic choice of the
mechanism $. Putting this together with Proposition 3.2 gives the
overall picture of inefficiency of the N.E.
The role of S is decisive for our analysis in the economically
relevant case: dim Y.(s) = i-1 for all j and all s. The results here
are also sharper. As noted earlier, for any $,
codim N(u) in S = n(£-l)
codim E(u) in S = (n-l)U-l)
generically in u (Proposition 3.2). If dim S > n(£-l) + (n-l)(£-l) one
might think that it is possible for N(u) and E(u) to have a transversal
intersection. The points in this intersection (i.e., in EN(u)) would
then constitute robust, efficient N.E.'s as we vary the utilities u.
But, in the analysis via S , we can detect instances of $ when N(u)
and E(u) do not intersect for generic u, even if dim S > n(£-l) + (n-l)(£-l)
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This is the main thrust of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.3. More-
over S„ provides a simple method for checking inefficiency. If one
is handed a $, one computes S„ and $(S UQ), and the dimensions of both
sets. The inefficiency properties of N.E. for generic u can then be
read off from this data.
In section 4 we apply our results to the "sell-all" and "buy-
sell" mechanisms due to Shapley and Shubik. In the "buy-sell" mechanism
dim S = 2n(£-l) > n(£-l) + (n-l)(£-l) and we are in the situation when
robust, efficient N.E. cannot a priori be ruled out by a straight dimen-
sion count. But we find that, in both these mechanisms, S nn consists
of strategies which leave each player with his initial endowment . Proposi-
tion 3.1 then implies that all N.E. are inefficient for generic u. How-
ever this can be seen directly as well. It is obvious that the gradients
of the traders' utilities at the initial endowment will not, for generic
u, all point in the same direction. When this is so the initial endow-
ment is not efficient (see the easy argument in the proof of Proposition
2.2). The inefficiency of N.E. now follows immediately from Proposition 2.2.
Thus the simple, but at least to us surprising, structure of S in the Shapley-
Shubik models yields an elementary analysis of them. This result was obtained
in [2] for the "sell-all" mechanism. We should point out that we
derive it in a significantly simpler way. The existence of S UQ was not
noticed in [2] necessitating a "brute force" argument. Here a brisk
calculation leads to S UQ and thereby to the same result.
Two notions of efficiency ("economic"—which we have dis-
cussed so far—and "strategic," see section 2) are considered. The
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conclusions above also carry over to strategic efficiency- Here it is
no longer necessary to assume that the range of $ is the space of
reallocations. Depending again only on $, there is a set ST,, C S
such that, for any choice of utilities, all strategically efficient
N.E. lie in ST
IJn
(but now there may exist N.E. in STt, which are also
strategically inefficient) . ST UQ typically has positive codimension
in S and, when this is the case, the set of strategically efficient
N.E. has the same codimension in the set of all N.E.
Returning to the Shapley-Shubik mechanisms, it turns out
that in both of them STt,q consists of strategies that leave at least
one player with his initial endowment. This leads to the strategic
inefficiency of N.E.
Throughout we restrict ourselves to N.E. that do not occur
on the boundary of the strategy-sets. This is largely a matter of
technical convenience. If the strategy-sets have "nice" boundaries
(e.g. , are simplices) and $ is defined smoothly in a neighborhood of
S, our analysis can be carried through to the boundary. In fact
k. = dim Y.(s) becomes variable with s now, and we need to "patch"
J J
together the cases for different k. (remark 3.3).
2. Ultra-Optimal and Ultra-Inoptimal Points
We begin with the following set-up which is somewhat more
general than the market mechanism described earlier. Assume that there
are n players and that associated to each player j are:
(i) a strategy set S.
(ii) an outcome space Y.y
3
(iii) a map $ . : S, x ... x S -* Y.
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Let S = S x . . . x s . A choice of strategies s = (s
n ,
. .., s ) e Sin In
determines the outcome $.(s) e Y. for the j player.
We assume throughout that Y. is a smooth manifold and that
the utility function u. of the j player is a C -function on Y . . A
choice of utilities u = (u
, ..., u ) together with the maps $
.
, defines
the strategic market game. Let Y = Y, x ... x Y and $ : S •* Y be the
map $, x . . . x $ .
1 n
Generally, if M is a manifold of dimension d, we will use
the following notation:
a) T (M) is the tangent space to M at m (it is a vector
space of dimension d)
b) T*(M) is the cotangent space to M at m.
m
Recall that the cotangent space T*(M) is, by definition, the dual vector
space to T (M) . For v e T (m) and w e T*(M), we denote the value of wr m m m
at v by wv z R.
For this section, there is no need to impose any dif ferentiable
structure on the S. or $.. We consider market mechanisms $ which satisfy
3 J
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the following assumption (see, however, remarks 3.3 and 3.5):
Assumption 1 : If all but the j player fix their strategies, then the
j player can, by changing his own strategy, span a submanifold of Y.
of codimension one. (A submanifold of codimension one is called a hyper-
surface. )
Let s = (s, , ..., s ) e S. Let Y.(s) denote the hypersurface
in Y. that the j player can span when the k player remains fixed
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at s for all k ^ j. We will call Y.(s) the j player's holding hyper-k J
surface at s. For y e Y.(s), the tangent space T (Y.(s)) is a codimen-
sion one linear subspace of T (Y
.
) . SetH
y j
V.(¥) = {w e T* ,-. : wv = for all v e T ,-. (Y
.
(~s~) ) } .
3 *.(s) ft.(s) j
Thus V.(s) is the one-dimensional space of linear functions on T\ ,-^Ci . (s))
3 ft.(s) j v "
which vanish on T. ,—v(Y.(s)).
ft. (s) j
j
Let Vu. be the gradient of u. , that is, the vector of
derivatives of u. with respect to outcome variables on Y . . For y e Y.,
j J
J
3
Vu.(y) e T*(Y.) and Vu.(y) # v is the directional derivative of u. in the
3 y j j j
direction v.
A choice of strategies s = (s. , . .
.
, s ) e S is called a Nash
Equilibrium for the utility functions u = (u, , . .
.
, u ) if, for all j
,
u ($ (s
1
,
..., s
n
)) > u. (*. (s^ ..., s. lt t, s.+1> ..., sn )) for all t e S
.
Let N(u) denote the subset of S of Nash equilibria for the utilities u.
Lemma 2.1: Let s e N(u). Then
Vu.($.(s)) e V.(s)
3 3 3
for all j = 1, . .
.
, n.
Proof : Suppose that for some j and s £ S, Vu.($.(s)) i V.(s). Then
there is a vector v £ T. ,— N (Y.(s)) such that Vu.($.(s))*v > 5 and v
ft. (s) J j J
defines a direction in Y.(s) along which u. is increasing. Player j
can move in this direction by changing only his own strategy, hence
¥ i N(u)
.
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Remark 2.1: Suppose that the Y.(s) are contained in Euclidean space
J
and the sets {x e R : x <_ y for some y in Y.(s)} are convex. Then
if utilities are concave and non-decreasing in each variable, any local
maximum on Y.(s) will be a global maximum and the condition of Lemma
2 . 1 in this case is also sufficient for s to be in N(u)
.
Fix Y
Q
C x such that $(S) C Y Q . We shall regard Y Q as the
set of outcomes that are feasible from a purely economic point of view,
though not necessarily achievable through a strategy-choice.
Definition : Given utilities u = (u. , . .
.
, u ) , a strategy choice s e S
is called:
a) economically efficient if there does not exist a
y = (y 1 , •••> yn ) £
YQ such that
u.(y.) > u.($.(s)) for all j = 1, ..., n
J J - J J
with strict inequality for some j
.
b) strategically efficient if there does not exist
a strategy choice s' e S such that
u. ($.(!')) > u. ($.(!)) for all j = 1, ..., n
with strict inequality for some j
Definitions a) and b) differ only when the map $ : S -* YQ is not onto.
Let E(u) and E (u) be the sets of economically efficient and stratetically
efficient strategies respectively. Then E(u) C E (u) . Set
EN(u) = E(u) H N(u)
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EN
g
(u) = E
s
(u) n N(u) .
For the rest of this section, we consider a market mechanism
where the Y. represent the spaces of final holdings of the players.
£ 1 £ £ i
Let R,. ={y=(y,...,y)£R : y > for all i} and assume that
i i
£ 1 £
Y. = R, . for all j. For each player j, let a. = (a., ..., a.) e Y.
be the "initial endowment" of player j and set
Y
o
= «y ..., y) e Y
±
» ... « Y
n
: j y - Z a } .
3=1 J j=l
Y
n
represents the space of reallocations of the initial endowment such that
each player holds a positive amount in each commodity. Assume that $
maps S to Y. C Y. x ... x Y , i.e.,r 1 n
.
n n
Z $.(s) - I a.
for all s e S.
Definition : A strategy s e S is called
a) Ultra-optimal if the one-dimensional subspaces
V.(s) coincide for all j.
b) Ultra-inoptimal if, for some pair j and k,
Let S and S denote the subsets of ultra-optimal and ultra-inoptimal
points of S. It is clear that S = S U S and S n S = 0.
1 £
Let U be the space of C -functions u on R such that:
a) u is strictly concave: u(tP + (l-t)Q) > tu(P) + (l-t)u(Q)
for all < t < 1 and P, Q e R
£
.
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b) Vu(y) = (3u(y)/9x
1
, ..., 8u(y)/3x ) is a vector
with strictly positive components for all y e R
Proposition 2.2 : Let $ : S ->- Y be a market mechanism satisfying
Assumption 1. Then the decomposition S = S U S has the follow-
ing property: for all u = (u..
,
. .., u ) e U
EN(u) = S
UQ
.i N(u) .
In other words, if s e N(u) H S , then s is economically efficient
and if s e N(u) H S , then s is economically inefficient.
Proof: Let s e N(u) H S TT^. By Lemma 1.1, Vu. ($.(¥)) e V.(¥) for allUO JJ J
j and since the V.(s) all coincide, there is a single vector v with
positive components such that
Vu.($.(s)) = X.v
for some positive number X
. ,
for all j . If s were not economically
I
efficient there would exist vectors x n , . . . , x e R such that1 n
n
Z x. = 0, $. (s) + x e Y., and such that
j =1
J J j J
u,($.(s) + x.) > u.($«(s)) for all j
J J J - J J
with strict inequality for some j. Since the u. are strictly concave
u. (*.(¥) + tx.) > u. ($.(¥))
for all < t < 1 with strict inequality for some j. Hence Vu. ($. (s) ) *x. >_
for all j with strict inequality for some j. Since Vu.($.(s)) = X.v, we
have vx. >^ for all j with strict inequality for some j and this con-
n
tradicts the assumption E x . = 0.
J-l J
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Now suppose that s e S n N(u). Then there is a pair j and
k such that V
.
( s ) t V
fe
(s) , and since Vu ($ (s) ) e V (s) and 7uk ($k (s)) e Vfc(¥)
,
there is a vector x e R such that
Vu.(*. (s))«x >
Vu
k (*k
(s))«(-x) >
Hence for t sufficiently small and positive, $ . (s) + tx e Y ,
<l> (s) - tx e Y , and:
u.($.(s) + tx) > u. ($.(¥))
Uj^Cs) + tx) > uk ($k (s))
and the reallocation assigning u.(<f>.(s)) to player i for i ?* j, k and
$.(s) + tx (resp. $, (s) - tx) to player j (resp. k) shows that s is
J k
not economically efficient.
3. Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
In this section we retain the set-up of Proposition 2.2.
The initial endowment vectors a. and a market mechanism $ : S -»• Yn are
J
fixed, where $ satisfies Assumption 1. We take the space of utility
functions U to be as in section 1 except that now we must also require
— r+2
that all u £ U be C —functions where r = max{dim S - n(£-l)
,
(n-l)£}
The topology on these functions will be as follows. Let Z be the cube
Z i i a
{y e R, : -e < y < E a. + e} in R , where e is any positive number.
j = l
J
Then Z contains all possible final holdings of any trader. Let
|| u || = sup sup |Du(y) |
D yeZ
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where Du ranges over all derivatives of u of order 0, 1, ..., r+2
.
The norm
|
u
|
makes U = {u z U : j| u | is finite} into a Banach
space—see Theorem 10.2 in [1].
Proposition 3.1 . Suppose $(S ) is contained in a submanifold M of
Y
n ,
where codimension of M > n. Then there exists an open dense set
U^ of U such that, for all u = (u, , . .., u ) in U
n
, EN(u) is empty.
n n
Proof : Let W = {
z
n ,
. . .
, z - z . e Z, Z z . = E a.}. Then W is
1 n l . t i . , ii=l i=l
relatively open in the affine span of Y_ and contains the closure Y
n
of Y
n
in its relative interior. Consider the map
,n
\\i : U x W * W x Mat (n,£)
given by
(u,y) (u
x
, ..., u
n
; yv ..., yQ) 1'
vu^)
7W
where Mat (n,£) is the set of n x i matrices with positive entries.
For A z Mat (n,£), the rows of A will be denoted by A., ..., A . Put
E = {A z Mat (n,£) : A. = X.v for some v e R, , and X . > 0; i = 1, .... n}
J J ++3
Then E is a submanifold of codimension (n-l)(£-l) in Mat (n,£).
It is clear that $ is transverse to every submanifold of
W x Mat (n,£), in particular to M * E. Let ty— '• W -> W x Mat (n,l) be
the map defined by '^—(y) = i|Ku,y) . By the transversal density and open-
ness theorems (see [1]) there is an open dense set U^ of U such that,
if u z U^., then \p— is transverse to M x E at every y z Y
fi
(recall that
-15-
Y
n
is the closure of Y„ and is compact.) So, for u e UQ (and viewing
ib— as restricted to the domain Y„ C W) ,
u u
codim U»H (M * E) = codim M x E
u
> (n-l)U-l) + n-1
= (n-l)£
= dim Y
Q
.
This implies that ib^ (M x E) is empty if u e UQ .
But if s £ EN(u) and $(s) = y, then ^(y) e * (Suo ) * E c M x E
by Proposition 2.2 (and its proof), i.e., y e t^- (M x E) . This shows
that EN(u) is empty if u e UQ .
Remark 3.1 . Clearly Proposition 3.1 continues to hold if $(S ) is
contained in a finite union of submanifolds of Y
fi
, each of which has
codimension at least n.
When $(S ) has codimension n-1 or less, there may be robust,
efficient N.E.'s. Nevertheless "most" N.E.'s are still inefficient as
our next proposition shows. Now we assume, in addition, that the S.
are bounded, smooth manifolds in Euclidean spaces; for simplicity,
suppose they are open sets. Each $ . is defined smoothly on an open
set T which contains the closure S of S. We require Assumption 1 to
hold for $. on all of T. Also T is chosen suitably small so that
$(T) c W.
Proposition 3.2 . There is an open dense set U* of U such that for
all u £ U*:
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(a) N(u) is contained in a submanifold of codimen-
sion n(2,-l) in S
(b) E(u) is a submanifold of codimension (n-l)(£-l)
in S
(c) If S
n
is contained in a finite union of submani-
folds of codimension at least t in S , then EN(u)
is contained in a finite union of submanifolds
of codimension at least n(£-l) + t in S
.
Proof: Let ty* be the map
U
1* x T ^ T x Mat ( n> j,)
given by
(u1? . . . , un ;s) s,
Vu
1
($(s))
Vu ($(s))
n
Let
N* - {(s,A) e T x Mat (n,£) : A. e V.(s)}
,
E* = {(s,A) e T x Mat (n,£) : A. = A.v for some U e R and A . > 0, j = 1, . .
.
,
13 ++ J
Then N is a submanifold of T * Mat (n,£) of codimension n(£-l), and E is
of codimension (n-1) (JJ.-1) . It is clear that if* is transverse to every
submanifold of T x Mat (n,£). Therefore there is an open dense set U*
in U such that, if u e U*, ip*. is transverse to N* and to E* at each s
in the compact set S". Since N(u) C ^* (N*) and E(u) = if*_~ (E*) conclu-
u u
sions (a) and (b) follow. If S TT^ CM. U ... U M where the M. are submani-UO 1 r j
folds of S of codimension at least t, then by Proposition 2.2,
-17-
r
-1
EN(u) C U ij,* (H. x N*)
j=l u J
If U* is chosen so that ijj* is also transverse to each of M. x N*, then
u
conclusion (c) also follows.
Corollary 3.3 . If codim S > dim S - n(£-l), then EN(u) is empty for
generic u.
Remark 3.2 . On the face of it, Proposition 3.2 leaves open the possi-
bility that all N.E. may be economically efficient. But a little reflec-
tion shows that this is not so. Suppose $ satisfies the condition of
remark 2.1. Then
N(u) = {s e S : ip(s,u) £ N} .
From the proof of Proposition 3.2 we see that, for generic u z U
,
(a) N(u) is either empty or a manifold of codimension n(£-l) in S,
(b) EN(u) is either empty or contained in a finite union of submani-
folds with codimension at least t in the Nash manifold N(u)
.
Remark 3.3 . Suppose dim Y.(s) = codim V.(s) = k. <_ l-l for j = 1, ..., n
and s e S, with strict inequality for at least one j. Let N* be as
before, i.e.
,
N* = {(s,A) e S x Mat (n,£) : A. e V.(s) for j = 1, ..., n} .
Put k = k, + ... + k . Then codimension N* = k, so by the same proofIn r
as that of Proposition 3.1, we get—for generic u
—
(a)* N(u) is contained in a submanifold of codimen-
sion k in S.
-18-
Next define
EN* = {(s,A) £ S x Mat (n,0 : A. e V.(s) and A. = X.v for some v e R £
J -J J J
and X >
, j * 1 , . .
.
, n } .
Put k^ = max k .
.
Then EN* is contained in a finite union of submani-
l<j<n J
folds of S x Mat (n,&), each of which has codimension at least k., + (n-1) (£-1) .
(To see this, suppose w.l.o.g. that k = max k.. Then EN* is contained,
j
J
for instance, in:
{(s,A) e S x Mat (n,£) : A
±
e V^s) and A. = \.A, for X. > 0, j = 2, ..., n) } .)
•J J J
But
EN(u) C { s e S : i|;*(s,u) e EN*} .
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2, the map
ifr- : S * S x Mat (n,A)
given by '4r-(s) = i^(s,u) is transverse to every submanifold of its image
for generic u in U . Thus, for generic u, we have
(b)* EN(u) is contained in a finite union of sub-
manifolds, each of which has codimension at
least k^ + (n-l)U-l) in S.
Putting together (a)* and (b)* with Remark 3.1, the picture (for
generic u in U ) is: (i) N(u) is either empty or a submanifold of
S with codimension k, (ii) EN(u) is either empty or contained in a
finite union of submanifolds with codimension at least k^ + (n-l)(£-l) - k >
in N(u)
.
-19-
This leaves the case of k.(s) varying with s. If S and $ are
1 1 _ • itnice enough, we can suppose that there is a finite partition of S into
manifolds A,, ..., A, such that k, (s) , . .., k (s) are all constant on
L l ± n
each A.. Our analysis shows inefficiency of the N.E. for s e A. and
i 1
generic u. Putting together the £ cases, we get the inefficiency on S.
This case arises naturally when traders are on the boundary of their
strategy sets. To be precise suppose each S. = M. U ... U M. is a
J J J
finite union of manifolds (e.g., S. is a simplex) and that $ is defined
smoothly on a neighborhood of S. Take the A. to be all possible products
M? (1) x ... x M
a(n)
,
1 < a(i) < k(i). Then, for "well-behaved" $
1 n — —
(e.g., the Shapley-Shubik mechanisms), it will turn out that
k. (s)
,
..., k (s) are constant for s e A. . When this happens our
analysis obviously extends to the boundary. See [3] for an explicit
treatment of the boundary for similar questions in a purely game-
theoretic context.
Remark 3.4 . For s e S, the condition that allV.(s) coincide is defined
"in general" by (n-l)(£-l) equations. It seems likely that if the S.
are bounded open subsets of Euclidean space, then a rigorous argument
could be given to show that the codimension of S _ in S in (n-l)(£-l)
for a generic class of market mechanisms. We indicate briefly how this
might be done. Let ft be the set of smooth maps $ from S to Y
n
which
satisfy Assumption 1. Then $ = $- x . . . x $ where $ . : S -> Y . andy F 1 n j j
—
— £ £-1
for each s e S, V.(s) defines a line in R . Let P ' denote the
projective space of all lines in R . It is a compact manifold of
I
dimension (£-1) whose points correspond to lines in R . Let \\i be
the map
-20-
£-1 n\J;:fixS->S^(P )
($,s) * (s.V^s), ..., V
n
(s)) .
£-1 n
and let UO = {(s,V., . .
.
, V ) e S x (P
x
) : V. - V - ... - V }. Thenin l z n
for all $ e Q,
S
UQ ($)
= {s e S : iK$,s) e UO}
where S ($) denotes the set of ultra-optimal points in S with respect
to the market mechanism $. It can probably be shown that, with respect
to suitable topologies, there is a dense open set Q.~ C fi such that fl
n
is a Banach manifold. One would then show that ip restricted to fi_ x S
£-1 n
is transverse to the submanifold UO of S x (P ) . Since the codimen-
Jl-1
n
sion of UO in S x (P ) is (n-l)(£-l), the desired conclusion would
follow from the transversal density and openness theorems.
Remark 3.5 . A "local" version of Assumption 1 would have been sufficient
for our analysis. For any s = (s , ..., s ) and 1 <^ j <_ n suppose:
—
— Z-l(a) There a neighborhood of $
.
(s) in Y.(s) which is dif feomorphic to R
or
(b) There is a neighborhood N of s. in S . such that
J J
$.(s-., ..., s , t, s , ..., s ) = teN} is dif feomorphic
to R
In either case, define V.(s) to be the appropriate normal and the analysis
goes through exactly as before. The stronger Assumption 1 was made for
ease of presentation.
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4. The Shapley-Shubik Mechanisms ([8], [9], [10])
We now examine the results of Sections 1 and 2 in a special
case: the Shapley-Shubik "buy-sell" mechanism. There are n players
and I commodities, where the £ commodity is treated as money. The
1 £ £initial endowment vectors a. = (a., ...,a) e Y. = R,, are given and
3 3 3 ++
&
the j player's strategies consist of a bid b. of money to purchase
commodity i and an offer to sell a quantity q. of commodity i (1 <_ i < £-1)
Player j's strategy is represented by two vectors
b
j
= (b
j
bT
l)
-
q
i '
(q j q j
_1)
and
£-1
Z
i=l
S. = {(b.,q.) e hL.
1
x / 1 : q 1 < a 1 and b^ < a.}
j 1
,H
2 ++++3 3 ,._-, 3 3
2(£-l)
S. is an open set in R and dim S = 2n(£-l) . Let
n n
B = Z b.,Q = Z q.
3-1 J i-l J
be the total amounts bid and offered on commodity i. Then
i B
1
is the price formed on commodity i.
The outcome is given by distributing the total amount of
each commodity offered among the players in proportion to their bids
and the total amount of money bid on each commodity in proportion to
the offers. The outcome of player j will be denoted by
1 £
x. = (x
,
..., x.) c Y. and is given by:
-J J J J
. b
1
x
1
= a
1
- q
1
+ -4 (1 < i < £-1)
3 3 3
p
x " -
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£-1
.
i-1
.
.
I I _ ,i _ i i
x. = a . - l b . + Z pq. .
3 3 ±.i J i= i J
We compute the hypersurfaces Y.(s) and the lines V.(s) (or equivalently
J J
the normals to the holding hypersurfaces Y.(s)) in the next lemma. Set
. . . . .
B
1
B
i
= z b
k ' Q i
= z qk • p i
=
"i •
Then p. is the price on commodity i formed by the players other than j.
Lemma 4.1 : a) The hypersurface Y.(s) is defined by the equation
Jt-1 B^a1 - x1 )
x. = a. + I . :
—
"
—r .
J J i=l Q. + a. - x.
J J J
b) A vector normal to Y.(s) at $.(s) is given by:
2 2 2
.. l/ 1 , 2, 2 , i-l, i-1 .,
((p ) P. , (P ) p , •• ., (p ) p. , 1) .
Proof : To prove a), we have to show that for i = 1, ..., i-1,
B
±
(a ± - x1 )
PV _ ^ = -J_J 1
3
C
J J J
Q
1
+ a
1
- x
1
and then summing over i gives the result. Since p = B /Q ,
B
1
= B
1
- b
1
,
and 0^ = Q
1
- q
1
,
we have to check that
j J J J
si i bi
(B - b
i
)Ui- x i )
Q
1 J J (Q
1
- q
1
+ a
1
- x
1
)
Since
b
1
by
a - x = q
1
-
—*- = q . - -^-:— , this is easily verified
j j j P
1 J B
1
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To prove b) , note that B. and Q. do not depend on player j and a normal
to a hypersurface in parametric form, as in a) , is given by
(9x./9x., ..., 9x./9x. ,-1) where x. is a function of x., .... x.
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
as in a) . From a) , we have
9x* -B^ 1
__1 J.J
„ i • . .2
9x. fJL i is
: (Qj + a. - x.)
and it is easy to check that Q. + a. - x. = B./p 1 . Hence a normal is
2
J J J J
given by ((p ) p , ..., (p ) p ,1).
A strategy is ultra-optimal when the lines spanned by the
normals to the hypersurfaces Y.(s) coincide. Since the prices p coin-
cide for all players, s e S if and only if the quantities p. are
independent of j for i = 1, ..., 2,-1. This gives the (n-l)(£-l) inde-
pendent equations defining S .
Suppose that p. is independent of j for all i, say p. = A..
Then we have
B. -b X
f - A. , or
(*) B± " b j
= A
i
(Ql
" q
j
}
for all j. Summing (*) over j shows that A. = p . Substituting this
back in (*) gives:
.
b
1
.
i 3 i
pj i
- p
•
When this holds, the outcome to each player is simply his initial
endowment
.
We have
:
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Proposition 4.2 . In the buy-sell mechanism, the set S of ultra-
optimal strategies consists of those strategies such that each player's
outcome is his initial endowment, that is, such that:
b. = p q. for all i and i .
J J
A variant of the buy-sell mechanism is the sell-all mechanism,
in which all players are required to offer their entire endowment for
sale, i.e., q. = a. for all i and j. Clearly here again we have:
Proposition 4.3 . In the sell-all mechanism, S consists of the strategies
such that b. = a.p for all i and j and each such strategy gives each
player his initial endowment as the outcome.
It turns out that the market mechanism in both cases blows
at strategies at which the total bid or offer (or both) is zero for any
commodity. However if we confine ourselves to the subset V of U given
by V = {ueU : a< Vu<b}, for some positive vectors a and b, then
there exist positive numbers c and d such that (in either model)
N(u) CT={7eS:c< p X (s) < d for i = 1, ..., 1-1}
for u e V . This is shown in Lemma 1 of [1] for the sell-all mechanism
and can be shown for the buy-sell mechansim in the same way. By apply-
ing Proposition 3.1 to the set T for all d > c > 0, we obtain the next
proposition.
Proposition 4.4 . There is an open dense set U
n
C U such that, for all
u = (u. , ..., u ) e UQ , EN(u) is empty in both the "sell-all" and the
"buy-sell" mechanisms.
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But, as we observed in the introduction, Proposition 4.4
can be seen directly from Proposition 2.2 without using Proposition 3.1,
5. Strategic Efficiency
Assume now that strategy sets S , outcome spaces Y , and maps
J J
$ S -* Y satisfying Assumption 1 are given, and assume that the S.
J J
J
are smooth manifolds and that the $. are smooth maps. To examine
strategic efficiency, we will define a decomposition S = ST^ U STUQ
similar to the decomposition S = S j. U SUQ defined in Section 1
when
Y„ is a space of reallocations.
Let d$. be the Jacobian of the map $ . . We may write
d$. = [d$., ... d$. ]
-.
,
.
th .. f
where d$ is the matrix of partial derivatxves of the j player sji
outcomes with respect to the i player's strategies. Assumption 1
of Section 2 will now be changed to:
Assumption 1' : For all j and all s e S, d$..(s) has rank equal to
(dim Y. - 1).
This is the infinitesimal version of Assumption 1.
Let V u. be the gradient of partial derivatives of u. with
s J J
respect to the strategic variables. By the chain rule:
V u. = (Vu.) «d$. .
s J Y J
According to a simple lemma of Smale, if s e E (u) , then the vectors
V u.(s) are linearly dependent. Let v.(s) denote a non-zero vector
s J J
in V.(s); it is determined up to scalar multiples. Smale 's lemma and
-26-
Lemraa 2.1 yield the following. (Concavity of utilities is not needed
here, only that the gradients be nowhere-vanishing.)
Lemma 5.1 : Let ST be the set of s £ S with the property: the vectors
(v.(s))*d$. are linearly dependent. Then for all utilities u = (u, , ..., u ):
N(u) n E
s
(u) C ST
UQ .
If we let ST be the complement of ST in S, then S = ST U ST .
For all choices of utilities (with nowhere-vanishing gradients) , the effi-
cient Nash equilibria, if there are any, all lie in ST . An analogue
of Proposition 3.2 is also true in the context of stratetic efficiency,
where S is replaced by ST . Generically, the set of efficient Nash
equilibria will have codimension t in N(u) if ST has codimension t in
S. Let m = dim S. Since m > n, the condition that the n vectors
m
v.(s)*d$. be linearly dependent is defined by equations— those
obtained by setting the determinants of all n x n minors of the matrix
with rows v,(s)»d$. (j = 1, . .
.
, n) equal to zero. These equations may
not define independent conditions on s, but one may expect that for a
generic class of $, ST has positive codimension in S. This is true
for the Shapley-Shubik models, as we shall see below, and this explains
the inefficiency result of [2], according to which, generically in
utilities, the Nash equilibria are strategically inefficient in the
sell-all model.
Consider the buy-sell model with n players and I commodities
(the I commodity is money). With notation as before, let:
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'jk
r3x
r
3
8 b.
1
k
3x.
J
HI
,
Bjk
5 13x.
J
3qk
!
3x l
J
M
so that the I * 2(£-l) matrix d$ is given by
Jk
It is easy to compute that
c
1
.
«
33
B - b.
0, ..., ,
«i i
B P
.-, ,
h - £
j
.th
v
i place
'jk 0, ..., ,
-b
1
1
.th .
l place
for j t k
33
0, ..., ,
b
1
- B
1
3
B"
~v
.th
,l place
, ,
p"
n1 xQ " q
.i
{
Q'
jk 0, ..., , -J , . .., , -p
1
V"
IQ
1
]
—
L
for j jt k
.th ,
l place
-28-
As we saw in Section 4,
v (s) =
q, - Q"
(p
1
) B^b 1
3)
.., (P )
2
< l-l
- Q
l
B*"
1
1.
,
-1
defines a vector in V.(s). For j ^ k, set
w. =
J
K 1 1 1b . - p q .
J J
2,-1
J
2,-1 l-l
- p q
i
B - b .
J
B*"
1
- fa*"
1
J
11 k 1p q . - b.
_J 1
B^b 1
J
£-1
f £-1 l-l J
p q
i
- b.
J
A short calculation shows that in the n * 2n(£-l) matrix
V
1
(s)
L
V
n
(3)
J
•d<l>(s) is equal to
...
w.
w.
w
w.
w.
w
w.
w.
...
w
w.
w.
w.
...
2(1-1)
In order for s to lie in ST , the above matrix must have linearly
dependent rows. It is easily checked that this is possible only if
w. = (0, 0, ..., 0) for some j, in other words, only if b . = p q
.
for i = 1, ..., l-l j for at least one player j. This gives
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Proposition 5.2 . In the Shapley-Shubik buy-sell and sell-all mechanisms,
ST consists of those strategies such that the outcome for at least
one player is his initial endowment, that is, for at least one j,
b. = p q. for i = 1, ..., l-l .
The codimension of ST is (l-l).
This result and Proposition 4.2 show clearly the difference
between economic and strategic efficiency of Nash equilibria. One can
easily check that the holding hypersurfaces Y.(s) are concave in the
Shapley-Shubik mechanisms. Hence, using Remark 3.1 and recalling that
codim N(u) = n(£-l), we get:
Proposition 5.3 . For generic u, the set of strategically efficient
N.E. is (i) either empty or a union of manifolds of codimension l-l
in N(u) in the buy-sell mechanism, (ii) empty in the sell-all mechanism.
Remark 5.1 . See [8] for explicit examples (with n = 2 and 1=2) which
presage, as well as corroborate, our analysis of the buy-sell and sell-all
mechanisms.
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